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THE MEDICAL, MORAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
OF RECENT MEDICAL ADVANCES
A SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION
DONALD

W.

DOWD'"

F OR

THE FOURTH CONSECUTIVE YEAR the Villanova
Law Review has sponsored a Symposium held at the Law School.
As in previous years, the principal purpose of the Symposium was to
promote active, vigorous exchange between members of diverse professions on a current problem of legal significance and of great mutual
concern. This year it was our pleasure to have doctors, philosophers,
and theologians join with judges, lawyers, law professors and students
in approaching the numerous questions presented by recent medical
advances which challenge our traditional concepts of life and death,
and our concepts of the ethical practice of medicine. Again, papers
were presented by various panelists and extended discussion encouraged
from the audience, and again in order to promote free and open exchange
no transcripts were made of the proceedings, but the principal speakers
were asked to submit manuscripts based on their remarks for publication at this time.'
A symposium perhaps has never been held that did not end witl,
the remark that more issues have been raised than could be solved,
and that the real value of the symposium was in getting its participants
started on thinking about questions that must be answered. This
Symposium was no exception. Ideas, assumptions, theories, and questions flew about with molecular frequency and velocity. As moderator
I had that somewhat thankless task of trying to pick out common
threads in the rich fabric of the discussion. I shall make no attempt
to summarize all of the various points of view advanced at the Symposium, but I should like to outline briefly the major lines of discussion
and the important questions which were raised. Of course, many of the
questions are dealt with more thoroughly and thoughtfully in the
published papers, but a sketch of the problems may be of some interest.
t Professor of Law, Villanova University. A.B., Harvard University, 1951,
LL.B., 1954.
1. William J. Curran, Professor of Health Law, Harvard Medical School, was
a member of the panel, but failed to submit a paper.
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The major problems considered in this Symposium were suggested by the activity in heart transplants and were discussed first in
relation to the donor of the organ, and then in relation to the donee.
The most critical problem concerning the donor of a heart was the
question of when he was to be considered "dead" so as to justify the
transplant. The necessity of quick transplants and the certainty that
the death of the donor would be caused by such a transplant has made
the question of a rapid and accurate determination of death crucial.
Much of the discussion on the day of the Symposium and in the following Articles dwells upon this problem. The doctors looked to the lawyers for a sufficiently precise definition so that they could proceed
without fear of legal sanctions in this area. The lawyers replied that
the consequences of death may be of great legal significance, but the fact
of death must necessarily be determined by medical criteria and, therefore, the doctors must develop and be able to justify the criteria so as
to warrant the determination of the existence of death. The feasibility
of using different concepts of death such as "brain death," "heart
death," or "physiological death" or some variants on these concepts
was extensively considered. Moreover, the idea of death as a process
rather than an event was advanced. All seemed agreed that the concept
of death was no mere mechanical determination, but was a profound
reflection of the concept of life, and the duty to sustain life.
Among the other questions considered were the legal and ethical
distinctions between the duty to sustain life in some circumstances, but
not in others; the possible difference in treatment of those who are
potentially donors and those who are not; the possible differences in
treatment between the poor and the rich, the young and the aged; the
purely legal question of the power to donate organs of those who are
dead, and many refinements on this problem. It was suggested that
advances made in the development of artificial organs and the preservation of live organs might reduce the urgency of the determination of
death. It was also noted that although the recent heart transplants
made the problem much more visible, the evaluation of what kind of
care should be given a terminal or questionably "dead" patient has
been an ever present one involving patients in great pain, or advanced
years, or who have lost irrevocably reasoning powers or the power to
act as complete persons. The necessity of developing reasonably clear
ethical standards which do not expose the doctor to legal liability was
made apparent. Although countless decisions of this nature will be
and have been made quietly, privately, and without any possibility of
legal or professional consequences, it was agreed that standards cannot be just personal to the doctor, but must be evolved by the prohttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/4
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fession in the light not only of medical values but of general community
values concerning the right to life.
The problems concerning the donee were of a different nature.
The critical question seems to be how far can a doctor go in applying
a new procedure which is of very low probability of success to a person
who, although seemingly hopelessly ill, is not in immediate danger of
death, when it is fairly clear that if unsuccessful the new procedure
will almost certainly result in death.
One question raised was whether the donee has consented to
such an operation. The problem of consent in this area is but a highlighted aspect of the problem of consent in many medical circumstances,
and in fact of the law generally. Can the young, the poor, the ignorant,
the imprisoned, those desperately in pain or deeply under the influence
of a professional man's greater learning, be said to have the ability
to "voluntarily" consent? Can a doctor rely on such consent? Are the
criteria developed by the law in determining whether a man has "consented" to a search of his house or given a voluntary confession relevant, or should we use concepts of consent which are relevant to the
ability to make a will or a gift? How much disclosure is necessary,
or how much independent advice?
Another point that was vigorously discussed was how to determine whether a procedure should be considered experimental or therapeutic. Is the possibility of success the touchstone? Does any possibility of success indicate that a procedure is therapeutic? Or should we
consider the fact that the investment in time, personnel, and money is
so great that it could not possibly be justified for the particular therapeutic effect on one person? If there is consent, should there be any
distinction made between "therapeutic" and "experimental" procedures?
Are there significant differences between procedures which are potentially lethal and those which may affect the body in some other fashion?
The tension between the doctor's role as a healer of his particular
patient and his role as one who advances medical knowledge was felt
by all, and there were suggestions of possible ways to reduce this
tension such as procedures to separate out the functions in a particular
situation to assure that the "curative" doctor and the "experimental"
doctor would never be the same. The fact that the doctor whose
primary role was therapeutic was consulted in a particular operation
also might be relevant to a finding of informed consent.
Other serious problems concerned the selection of potential donees
when the number of donors is severely limited, as well as the general
value of allocating limited hospital and research facilities and assets to
dramatic procedures which, even if successful, could be applied only in
very minimal
cases.
Published bya Villanova
Universitynumber.of
Charles Widger
School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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In our 1-day Symposium all of these questions could hardly be
resolved or even considered at any great length. But they do suggest
the excitement and the involvement that the Symposium generated.
We are very grateful to all of the participants for making the Symposium possible, and in particular I am grateful to the Villanova Law
Review and the panelists whose papers are printed herein for making
their ideas available to those who were unable to attend the Symposium.
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